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Abstract
Differential Privacy is one of the strongest privacy guarantees, which allows the
release of useful information about any sensitive dataset. However, it provides the
same level of protection for all elements in the data universe. In this paper, we
consider dX -privacy, an instantiation of the privacy notion introduced in [1], which
allows specifying a separate privacy budget for each pair of elements in the data
universe. We describe a systematic procedure to tailor any existing differentially
private mechanism into a dX -private variant for the case of linear queries. For the
resulting dX -private mechanisms, we provide theoretical guarantees on the trade-
off between utility and privacy, and show that they always outperform their vanilla
counterpart. We demonstrate the effectiveness of our procedure, by evaluating the
proposed dX -private Laplace mechanism on both synthetic and real datasets using
a set of randomly generated linear queries.
1 Introduction
Differential privacy [2] is a formal notion of privacy that allows a trustworthy data curator, in
possession of sensitive data from a large number of individuals, to approximately answer a query
submitted by an analyst while maintaining individual privacy. Intuitively, differential privacy ensures
that the data analyst knows no more about any individual in the dataset after the analysis, than she
knew before the start of the analysis. One common mechanism for achieving differential privacy is to
inject random noise to the answer of a query that is carefully calibrated according to the sensitivity of
the query and a global privacy budget . Sensitivity, in this case, is defined as the maximum amount
of change in answer to a query considering all neighboring datasets, i.e., datasets differing in one row
or equivalently having Hamming distance of one. One limitation of this definition is that it provides
the same level of protection for all elements in the data universe X .
In specific domains, it might be more natural to measure the distinguishability between two datasets by
some generic metric dX : X ×X → R+ instead of just Hamming distance. For instance, consider the
location-based systems where it might be acceptable to disclose coarse-grained information about an
individual’s location instead of his exact location. In this case, the geographical distance would be an
appropriate measure of distinguishability [3]. There are other scenarios where some attributes of the
dataset may need more protection than others, and vice versa. As an example, consider a classification
problem with instance space X ⊂ Rd where specific features of X are highly sensitive than others
(maybe due to fairness requirements [4]). In this case, dX (u, v) =
∑d
i=1 iJui 6= viK,∀u, v ∈ X
might be a reasonable choice for the metric.
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In the applications mentioned above, the standard differential privacy (with global privacy budget)
is too strong and compromises much in the utility. To address this limitation, several relaxations of
differential privacy have been proposed recently [1, 5]. In this work, we consider dX -privacy, an
instantiation of the privacy notion introduced in [1], for statistical databases. Intuitively, dX -privacy
allows specifying a separate privacy budget for each pair of elements u, v in the data universe X ,
given by the value dX (u, v). In Section 2.2, we formally define the dX -privacy and discuss its
properties.
Our primary objective is to develop dX -private mechanisms that provide a good trade-off (w.r.t. given
utility measure) between privacy and utility. Note that [1] have only constructed universally optimal
mechanisms [6] under specific dX metrics (such as Manhattan metric) for some particular class of
queries such as count, sum, average, and percentage queries. In particular, we want to tailor any
existing differential private mechanisms to satisfy dX -privacy. For this, we propose a utility measure
dependent pre-processing strategy which applies to any data universe X and any choice of the metric
dX .
1.1 Main Contributions
We describe a meta procedure (for any metric) to tailor any existing differentially private mechanism
into a dX -private variant for the case of linear queries. The main challenge is that the privacy budget,
i.e., dX , is specified on the input universe X , whereas the noise is added to the query response which
belongs to the outcome space. Thus we need to somehow propagate the information contained in the
metric to the output space.
The main component of our new mechanisms is a pre-processing optimization (depending on the
utility measure of interest) to choose the model parameters of the mechanism. We have provided the
explicit formulation of this pre-processing optimization problem for some commonly used utility
measures (under any metric). In general, these problems are non-convex and computationally chal-
lenging. But we show that for certain loss functions the optimization problem can be approximately
solved using heuristic approaches (e.g., Algorithm 3 for squared loss).
Based on the meta procedure, we describe dX -private variants of several well-known -differentially
private algorithms (both online and offline). In particular, we illustrate the dX -private variants of the
Laplace [2] and Exponential [7] mechanisms, as well as the SmallDB [8] and MWEM [9] mechanisms
for generating synthetic datasets.
We demonstrate the effectiveness of dX -privacy in terms of utility, by evaluating the proposed dX -
private Laplace mechanism on both synthetic and real datasets using a set of randomly generated
linear queries. In both cases we define the dX metric as the Euclidean distance between elements
in the data universe. Our results show that the utility from the dX -private variant of the Laplace
mechanism is higher than its vanilla counterpart, with some specific queries showing significant
improvement. We extend our techniques to Blowfish (Distance Threshold model) [5] privacy notion
as well, and show similar improvement.
2 Background and dX -Privacy
This section gives the background on differential privacy and associated concepts of linear queries,
sensitivity, and utility. We also introduce dX -privacy and its relation to other privacy notions.
Notation Let [n] := {1, . . . , n} for n ∈ N, and R+ := [0,∞). We write JP K = 1 if P is true andJP K = 0 otherwise. Let xi denote the ith coordinate of the vector x, and Ai,: denote the ith row of
the matrix A. We denote the inner product of two vectors x, y ∈ Rn by 〈x, y〉. The k-element vector
of all ones is denoted 1k := (1, . . . , 1)
>. For two vectors a, b ∈ Rn, the operation a b represents
element-wise multiplication. For a ∈ Rn and B ∈ Rn×d, the operation aB represents row-wise
scalar multiplication of B by the associated entry of a. For a vector a  0 represents that the vector
is element-wise non-negative. Hamming distance is defined as ‖x− y‖H :=
∑n
i=1 Jxi 6= yiK. The
`p-norms are denoted by ‖·‖p. For a matrix A, define ‖A‖p :=
(∑
i ‖Ai,:‖pp
)1/p
.
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2.1 Differential Privacy
Let X denote the data universe and N := |X | its size. A database D of n rows is modelled as a
histogram x ∈ NN (with ‖x‖1 = n), where xi encodes the number of occurrences of the ith element
of the universe X . Two neighboring databases D and D′ (from Xn) that differ in a single row
(‖D −D′‖H = 1) correspond to two histograms x and x′ (from NN ) satisfying ‖x− x′‖1 = 2.
A mechanismM : NN × Q  Y (where Y is the outcome space, and Q is the query class) is a
randomized algorithm which takes a dataset x ∈ NN and a query q : NN → Y , and answers with
some a ∈ Y . Informally, a mechanism satisfies differential privacy if the densities of the output
distributions on inputs x, x′ ∈ NN with ‖x− x′‖1 ≤ 2 are pointwise within an exp () multiplicative
factor of each other. Here  > 0 is a parameter that measures the strength of the privacy guarantee
(smaller  being a stronger guarantee).
Definition 1 (Differential Privacy, [2]). A mechanismM : NN ×Q Y is called -differentially
private if for all x, x′ ∈ NN such that ‖x− x′‖1 ≤ 2, for every q ∈ Q, and for every measurable
S ⊆ Y , we have
P [M (x, q) ∈ S] ≤ exp ()P [M (x′, q) ∈ S] .
2.2 dX -Privacy
Here we consider a relaxed privacy notion, which is a particular case of the definition from [1], for
statistical databases. Given a metric dX on the data universe, a mechanism satisfies dX -privacy if the
densities of the output distributions on input histograms x, x′ ∈ NN with ‖x− x′‖1 ≤ 2 and differ
on i, j-th entries are pointwise within an exp (dX (i, j)) multiplicative factor of each other.
Definition 2 (dX -Privacy). Let dX : [N ]× [N ]→ R+ be the privacy budget (such that dX (i, j) ≥ 0,
dX (i, j) = dX (j, i), dX (i, i) = 0, and dX (i, j) ≤ dX (i, k) + dX (k, j), ∀i, j, k ∈ [N ]) of the
data universe X . A mechanismM : NN × Q  Y is said to be dX -private iff ∀x, x′ ∈ NN s.t.
‖x− x′‖1 ≤ 2, xi 6= x′i, and xj 6= x′j (for some i, j ∈ [N ]), ∀S ⊆ Y and ∀q ∈ Q we have
P [M (x, q) ∈ S]
P [M (x′, q) ∈ S] ≤ exp (dX (i, j)) .
When dX (i, j) = ,∀i, j ∈ [N ], we recover the standard -differential privacy.
Most of the desirable properties of differential privacy is carried over to dX -privacy as well, with
suitable generalization.
Fact 1 (Properties of dX -Privacy). The dX -privacy satisfies the following desirable properties:
1. Resistant to post-processing: If M : NN × Q  Y is dX -private, and f : Y → Y ′ is
arbitrary any (randomized) function, then the composition f ◦M : NN ×Q Y ′ is also
dX -private.
2. Composability: Let Mi : Xn × Qi  Yi be a diX -private algorithm for i ∈
[k]. If M[k] : Xn × Πki=1Qi  Πki=1Yi is defined to be M[k]
(
x,Πki=1qi
)
=
(M1 (x, q1) , . . . ,Mk (x, qk)), thenM[k] is
∑k
i=1 d
i
X -private.
3. Group privacy: IfM : NN ×Q Y is a dX -private mechanism and x, x′ ∈ NN satisfy
‖x− x′‖1 ≤ k (with k ≥ 2), then ∀S ⊆ Y and ∀q ∈ Q we have
P [M (x, q) ∈ S]
P [M (x′, q) ∈ S] ≤ exp
(
k · max
i,j∈V
dX (i, j)
)
,
where V is the set of indices in which x and x′ differ.
dX -privacy can naturally express the indistinguishability requirement that cannot be represented by
the standard notion of distance such as Hamming distance. But the metric dX in the above definition
must be carefully defined to achieve different privacy goals. [3] have used the Euclidean metric
with the discrete Cartesian plane as the data universe, for location-based systems. Blowfish [5]
privacy (without constraints) considers a natural metric based on a minimum spanning tree with the
elements of the data universe as vertices, and with equal edge weights. Here the adversary may better
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distinguish the points farther apart in the tree, than those that are closer. But when some elements of
the data universe are highly sensitive than others, non-uniform edge weights can capture this priority
requirement.
Our main contribution is the construction of utility measure dependent dX -private mechanisms
(confer Section 3). Note that [1] have only constructed universally optimal mechanisms under certain
dX metrics (such as Manhattan metric) for some special class of queries such as count, sum, average,
and percentage queries.
2.3 Linear Queries and Sensitivity
Our focus is on the inherent trade-off between privacy and accuracy when answering a large number
of linear queries over histograms. Linear queries include some natural classes of queries such as
range queries [10, 11] and contingency tables [12, 13], and serves as the basis of a wide range of
data analysis and learning algorithms (see [14] for some examples). A linear query is specified by a
function q mapping dataset (histogram) to a real value. Formally, given a query vector q ∈ RN , a
linear query over the histogram x ∈ NN can be expressed as q (x) = 〈q, x〉. A set of k linear queries
can be represented by a query matrix Q ∈ Rk×N with the vector Qx ∈ Rk giving the correct answers
to the queries.
For dX -privacy, we consider a generalized notion of global sensitivity (defined in [2]):
Definition 3. For i, j ∈ [N ] (with i 6= j), the generalized global sensitivity of a query q ∈ Q (w.r.t.
‖·‖) is defined as follows
∆q‖·‖ (i, j) := max
x,x′∈NN :‖x−x′‖1≤2,xi 6=x′i,xj 6=x′j for i,j∈[N ]
‖q (x)− q (x′)‖.
Also define ∆q‖·‖ := maxi,j∈[N ] ∆
q
‖·‖ (i, j) (the usual global sensitivity). When ‖·‖ = ‖·‖p, we simply
write ∆qp.
Consider a multi-linear query Q : NN → Y ⊆ Rk defined as Q (x) = Qx, where Q ∈ Rk×N .
Then the generalized global sensitivity of Q (for i, j ∈ [N ]) is given by ∆Q‖·‖ (i, j) = ‖Q:,i −Q:,j‖.
When k = 1, i.e., for a single linear query q (x) = 〈q, x〉, we have ∆q‖·‖ (i, j) = |qi − qj |. Thus, the
generalized notion is defined separately for each pair i, j of elements in X .
2.4 Laplace and Exponential Mechanism
The Laplace mechanism is defined as follows:
Definition 4 (Laplace Mechanism, [2]). For a query function q : NN → R with `1-sensitivity ∆q1,
Laplace mechanism will output
Z = M
Lap,
∆
q
1
 ·1k
(x, q) := q (x) + (Y1, . . . ,Yk) , (1)
where Yi
iid∼ Lap
(
∆q1

)
, and Lap (λ) is a distribution with probability density function f (x) =
1
2λe
− |x|λ , ∀x ∈ R.
The Laplace mechanism satisfies the -differential privacy, but it satisfies dX -privacy only with
 ≤ mini,j∈[N ] dX (i, j). This would result in large noise addition, and eventually unnecessary
compromise on overall utility.
Given some arbitrary range R, the exponential mechanism is defined with respect to some utility
function u : NN ×R → R, which maps database/output pairs to utility scores. The sensitivity notion
that we are interested here is given by:
Definition 5. For i, j ∈ [N ] (with i 6= j) and u : RN ×R → R, the generalized utility sensitivity is
defined as follows
∆u (i, j) := max
r∈R
max
x,x′∈NN :‖x−x′‖1≤2,xi 6=x′i,xj 6=x′j for i,j∈[N ]
|u (x, r)− u (x′, r)|.
Also define ∆u := maxi,j∈[N ] ∆u (i, j).
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Formally, the exponential mechanism is:
Definition 6 (The Exponential Mechanism, [7]). The exponential mechanismMExp,∆u (x, u) selects
and outputs an element r ∈ R with probability proportional to exp ( 2∆u · u (x, r)).
The exponential mechanism also satisfies the -differential privacy, but it satisfies dX -privacy only
with  ≤ mini,j∈[N ] dX (i, j).
2.5 Utility
In the differential privacy literature, the performance of a mechanism is usually measured in terms of
its worst-case total expected error, defined as follows:
Definition 7 (Error). Let q : NN → Y ⊆ Rk and ` : Rk × Rk → R+. We define the `-error of a
mechanismM : NN ×Q Y as
err` (M, q) = sup
x∈NN
E
Z∼M(x,q)
[` (Z, q (x))]. (2)
Here the expectation is taken over the internal coin tosses of the mechanism itself.
In this paper, we are mainly interested in the worst case expected `p-error (defined by `p (y, yˆ) :=
‖y − yˆ‖p =
(∑k
i=1 |yi − yˆi|p
) 1
p
) for p ∈ {1, 2,∞}, and `22-error (given by `22 (y, yˆ) := ‖y − yˆ‖22).
It is also common to analyze high probability bounds on the accuracy of the privacy mechanisms.
Definition 8 (Accuracy). Given a mechanism M : NN × Q  Y , query q : NN → Y ⊆ Rk,
sensitive dataset (histogram) x ∈ NN , and parameters α > 0 and β ∈ (0, 1), the mechanismM is
(α, β)-accurate for q on x under the ‖·‖-norm if
P [‖M (q, x)− q (x)‖ ≥ α] ≤ β
where ‖·‖-norm can be any vector norm definition. In our analysis, we consider the ‖·‖1-norm and
the ‖·‖∞-norm.
3 dX -Private Mechanisms for Linear Queries
In this section, we design dX -private mechanisms by extending some of the well known -
differentially private (noise adding) mechanisms. The main challenge here is that the privacy
budget dX is defined on the input data universe X (⊆ RN ) and the noise is added to the query
response which belongs to the outcome space Y (⊆ Rk). The query response y ∈ Y contains only the
aggregate information (summary statistic) about the elements of the input database x ∈ Xn, and it
does not capture the dX -metric structure in the input domain X . Thus we need to somehow propagate
the dX (·, ·) information from X to Y .
Given a dataset x ∈ NN , and a query q : NN → Y ⊆ Rk, our approach (meta procedure) to design a
dX -private (noise adding) mechanism can be described as follows:
1. Choose the (approximately optimal) model parameters c ∈ Rk and q′ : NN → Rk such that
∆q
′
‖·‖ (i, j) ≤ dX (i, j), ∀i, j ∈ [N ], and c  0.
2. Then use an existing -differentially private mechanism with (c q′, c) in place of(
q,
∆q‖·‖
 1k
)
.
The model parameters q′ and c are chosen by (approximately) solving the following pre-processing
optimization problem (i.e. (q′, c) := Fpre-opt (q, n, dX (·, ·) , `)):
minimize
q′,c
f`,M (q′, c; q, n)
subject to ∆q
′
‖·‖ (i, j) ≤ dX (i, j) , ∀i, j ∈ [N ]
c  0,
(3)
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where f`,M (q′, c; q, n) is a surrogate function of the utility measure that we are interested in. Note
that this pre-processing optimization depends only on the data universe X (or [N ]), the query set Q,
and the database size n, but not on the dataset x. Thus we don’t compromise any privacy during the
optimization procedure. More over, we have to do the pre-processing optimization only once in an
offline manner (for given X , Q, and n). The number of constraints in the optimization problem (3)
can be exponentially large (≈ 2N ), but depending on the structure of the dX -metric the constraint
count can be significantly reduced.
Next we apply the above described abstract meta procedure in extending some -differential privacy
mechanisms under different loss measures such as squared loss and absolute loss. We first show that
the resulting mechanisms are in fact dX -private, and then we formulate the appropriate pre-processing
optimization problems (3) for them.
3.1 dX -Private Laplace Mechanism
For a given query q : RN → Y ⊂ Rk over the histogram x ∈ RN , consider the following variant of
Laplace mechanism (with the model parameters q′ : RN → Rk, and c ∈ Rk which depend on the
utility function of the task):
Z =MLap,c (x, c q′) := c q′ (x) + (Y1, . . . ,Yk) , (4)
where Yi
⊥∼ Lap (ci). When q (x) = Qx, we choose Q′ ∈ Rk×N and c ∈ Rk as the model
parameters i.e., q′ (x) = Q′x. Below we show that the above variant of Laplace mechanism satisfies
the dX -privacy under a sensitivity bound condition.
Proposition 1. If ∆q
′
1 (i, j) ≤ dX (i, j), ∀i, j ∈ [N ], then the mechanismMLap,c (·, c q′) given
by (4) satisfies the dX -privacy.
The sensitivity bound condition of the above proposition for a multi-linear query Q′ (x) = Q′x
can be written as: ∆Q
′
1 (i, j) =
∥∥Q′:,i −Q′:,j∥∥1 ≤ dX (i, j) , ∀i, j ∈ [N ]. The next proposition
characterizes the performance of theMLap,c (·, c q′) mechanism under different choices of utility
measures:
Proposition 2. Let Q : RN → Rk be a multi-linear query of the form Q (x) = Qx, and let
Z =MLap,c (x, cQ′) = cQ′x+ Y with Yi ⊥∼ Lap (ci).
1. When `22 (y, y
′) = ‖y − y′‖22, we have
err`22 (MLap,c (·, cQ′) , Q) ≤ 2
{
n2 ‖cQ′ −Q‖22 + 2 ‖c‖22
}
,
where err` (M, Q) is defined in (2).
2. When `p (y, y′) = ‖y − y′‖p, we have
err`p (MLap,c (·, cQ′) , Q) ≤ n ‖cQ′ −Q‖p + E
Yi
⊥∼Lap(ci)
[
‖Y‖p
]
.
Note that E
Yi
⊥∼Lap(ci)
[‖Y‖1] = ‖c‖1.
3. ∀δ ∈ (0, 1], with probability at least 1− δ we have
‖Qx− Z‖∞ ≤ n ‖cQ′ −Q‖∞ + ln
(
k
δ
)
· ‖c‖∞ .
Based on the upper bounds that we obtained in the previous proposition, we can formulate the
pre-processing optimization problem Fpre-opt (q, n, dX (·, ·) , `) to select the model parameters c and
Q′ of theMLap,c (·, cQ′) mechanism as follows:
minimize
Q′,c
f`,MLap,c(·,cQ′) (Q
′, c;Q,n)
subject to
∥∥Q′:,i −Q′:,j∥∥1 ≤ dX (i, j) ,∀i, j ∈ [N ]
c  0.
(5)
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The objective function of the above optimization problem depends on the utility function
that we are interested in. For example, when `22 (y, y
′) = ‖y − y′‖22, we can choose
f`22,MLap,c(·,cQ′) (Q
′, c;Q,n) = n2 ‖cQ′ −Q‖22 + 2 ‖c‖22. In summary, the dX -private Laplace
mechanism, under `22-error function, can be described as follows:
1. Choose the model parameters (Q′, c) by approximately solving the pre-processing optimiza-
tion problem Fpre-opt
(
Q,n, dX (·, ·) , `22
)
given by (5).
2. Release the response Z =MLap,c (x, cQ′) given by (4).
Observe that, when dX (i, j) = ,∀i, j ∈ [N ], the choices ci = c = ∆
Q
1
 ,∀i ∈ [k] and Q′ = 1cQ
satisfies the constraints of the optimization problem (5) under squared loss. In fact these choices
correspond to the standard Laplace mechanism M
Lap,
∆
q
1
 ·1k
, and thus our framework is able to
recover standard -differential privacy mechanisms as well.
3.2 dX -Private Exponential Mechanism
For a given utility function u : NN ×R → R over the histogram x ∈ RN , consider the following
variant of exponential mechanism (with the model parameters u′ : NN ×R → R, and c ∈ R which
will be chosen later based on the utility function):
Definition 9. The mechanismMExp,c (x, u′) selects and outputs an element r ∈ R with probability
proportional to exp
(
u′(x,r)
2c
)
.
Here we note that for ease of presentation, we do not consider using cr ∈ R for each r ∈ R. The
following theorem provides a sufficient condition for the above mechanism to satisfy dX -privacy.
Theorem 1. If ∆u′ (i, j) ≤ cdX (i, j) ,∀i, j ∈ [N ], then the mechanism MExp,c (·, u′) satisfies
dX -privacy.
For a given histogram x and a given utility measure u : RN ×R → R, let ?u (x) = maxr∈R u (x, r)
denote the maximum utility score of any element r ∈ R with respect to histogram x. Below we
generalize the Theorem 3.11 from [15]:
Theorem 2. Fixing a database x, letR?u′ = {r ∈ R : u′ (x, r) = ?u′ (x)} denote the set of elements
in R which attain utility score ?u′ (x). Also define δu,u′ := maxx,r |u (x, r)− u′ (x, r)|. Then for
Z =MExp,c (x, u′), with probability at least 1− e−t, we have
u (x,Z) > δu,u′ + ?u′ (x)− 2c
{
ln
(
|R|∣∣R?u′ ∣∣
)
+ t
}
.
Since we always have
∣∣R?u′ ∣∣ ≥ 1, we get
P [u (x,Z) ≤ δu,u′ + ?u′ (x)− 2c {ln (|R|) + t}] ≤ e−t.
The exponential mechanism is a natural building block for designing complex -differentially private
mechanisms. Next we consider two instantiations of the above variant of exponential mechanism,
namely small database mechanism [8], and multiplicative weights exponential mechanism [9]. The
main trick is that we need to choose appropriateR and the utility function u′.
3.2.1 dX -Private Small Database Mechanism
Here we consider the problem of answering a large number of real valued linear queries q : NN → R
of the form q (x) = 〈q, x〉 (where q ∈ RN , and x ∈ NN ) from class Q via synthetic his-
togram/database release. For this problem [8] have proposed and studied a simple -differentially
private small database mechanism, which is an instantiation of exponential mechanism. They have
used a utility function u : NN × R → R (with R =
{
y ∈ NN : ‖y‖1 = log |Q|α2
}
) defined as
u (x, y) := −maxq∈Q |q (x)− q (y)|.
Now we extend the mechanism developed in [8] to obtain a dX -private version of it using the
model parameters Q′ and c ∈ R (which are determined later). Algorithm 1 is a modified version
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Algorithm 1 Small Database Mechanism [8]: SmallDB(x,Q′, c, α)
LetR ←
{
y ∈ NN : ‖y‖1 =
log |Q′|
α2
}
Let u′ : NN ×R → R be defined to be:
u′ (x, y) := − c max
q′∈Q′
|q′ (x)− q′ (y)|. (6)
Sample And Output y ∈ R with the mechanismMExp,c (x, u′)
of Algorithm 4 from [15], where the transformation from Q to Q′ is one-to-one (thus we have
|Q′| = |Q|). When answering a query q ∈ Q over x, we need to output cq′ (y) where q′ ∈ Q′ is the
matching element of q and y is the output of the dX -private small database mechanism (Algorithm 1).
Following proposition provides the dX -privacy characterization of the small database mechanism.
Proposition 3. If
∣∣q′i − q′j∣∣ ≤ dX (i, j) ,∀i, j ∈ [N ] and ∀q′ ∈ Q′, then the small database mecha-
nism is dX -private.
The following proposition and theorem characterize the performance of the dX -private small database
mechanism.
Proposition 4 (Proposition 4.4, [15]). Let Q be any class of linear queries. Let y be the database
output by SmallDB (x,Q′, c, α). Then with probability 1− β:
max
q∈Q
|q (x)− cq′ (y)| ≤ nmax
q∈Q
‖q − cq′‖∞ + αn+ 2c
{
logN log |Q|
α2
+ log
(
1
β
)}
.
Theorem 3 (Theorem 4.5, [15]). By the appropriate choice of α, letting y be the database output by
SmallDB
(
x,Q′, c, α2
)
, we can ensure that with probability 1− β:
max
q∈Q
|q (x)− cq′ (y)| ≤ nmax
q∈Q
‖q − cq′‖∞ +
(
cn2
{
16 logN log |Q|+ 4 log
(
1
β
)})1/3
. (7)
From the upper bound of the above theorem, the model parameters Q′ and c of the small database
mechanism can be chosen through the following pre-processing optimization problem:
minimize
Q′,c
f (Q′, c;Q, n)
subject to
∣∣q′i − q′j∣∣ ≤ dX (i, j) , ∀i, j ∈ [N ] , q′ ∈ Q′
c ≥ 0,
(8)
where f (Q′, c;Q, n) = nmaxq∈Q ‖q − cq′‖∞ +
(
cn2
{
16 logN log |Q|+ 4 log
(
1
β
)})1/3
. See
Appendix B, for a brief discussion on the (non-convex) pre-processing optimization problems (5),
and (8).
3.2.2 dX -Private Multiplicative Weights Exponential Mechanism
As in the case of small database mechanism, here also we consider the problem of answering a large
number of real valued linear queries in dX -private manner. Algorithm 2 is a simple modification of
Algorithm 1 from [9]. Following theorem provides the dX -privacy characterization of the MWEM
mechanism.
Theorem 4. If
∣∣q′i − q′j∣∣ ≤ dX (i, j) ,∀i, j ∈ [N ] and ∀q′ ∈ Q′, then the MWEM mechanism is
dX -private.
The following theorem characterizes the performance of the MWEM mechanism.
Theorem 5 (Theorem 2.2, [9]). For any dataset x, set of linear queries Q, T ∈ N, and c > 0, with
probability at least 1− 2T/ |Q|, MWEM produces y such that
max
q∈Q
|cq′ (y)− q (x)| ≤ 2n
√
logN
T
+ 10Tc log |Q|+ nmax
q∈Q
‖cq′ − q‖∞ .
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Algorithm 2 Multiplicative Weights Exponential Mechanism [9]: MWEM(x,Q′, c, T )
Input: histogram x over a universe [N ], set Q′ of linear queries, privacy parameter c > 0, and
number of iterations T ∈ N.
Let n denote ‖x‖1, the number of records in x. Let y0 denote n times the uniform distribution
over [N ].
for t = 1, ...T do
1. Exponential Mechanism: Sample a query q′t ∈ Q′ using theMExp,2cT (x, u′t) mecha-
nism and the score function u′t : NN ×Q′ → R given by
u′t (x, q
′) := c
∣∣q′ (yt−1)− q′ (x)∣∣ .
2. Laplace Mechanism: Let measurement mt = cq′t (x) + Y with Y ∼ Lap (2cT ).
3. Multiplicative Weights: Let yt be n times the distribution whose entries satisfy ∀i ∈
[N ],
yti ∝ yt−1i × exp
(
(q′t)i ×
(
mt − q′t
(
yt−1
))
/2n
)
.
end for
Output y = avgt<T yt
By setting 2n
√
logN
T = 10Tc log |Q|, we get
max
q∈Q
|cq′ (y)− q (x)| ≤ nmax
q∈Q
‖cq′ − q‖∞ +
20
52/3
(
n2 logN log |Q|)1/3 c1/3.
The model parameters Q′ and c of the MWEM mechanism can be chosen through the optimization
problem 8 with f (Q′, c;Q, n) = nmaxq∈Q ‖cq′ − q‖∞ + 2052/3
(
n2 logN log |Q|)1/3 c1/3.
4 Experiments
Here we demonstrate the effectiveness of our framework via experiments on both synthetic and real
data. We will show that in many situations, we can drastically improve the accuracy of the noisy
answer compared to the traditional differentially private mechanisms.
4.1 Single Linear Queries over Synthetic Data
In order to evaluate our mechanism, we first consider randomly generated single linear queries
(q : NN → R). To that end, we compare the following two mechanisms: (a) the -differentially
private Laplace mechanism (with  = mini,j dX (i, j)): M
Lap,
∆
q
1

(x, q) = q (x) + Y, where
Y ∼ Lap
(
∆q1

)
, and (b) the dX -private Laplace mechanism (with the model parameters c ∈ R and
q′ ∈ RN ):MLap,c (x, cq′) = cq′ (x) + Y, where Y ∼ Lap (c), under the experimental setup given
below.
Data and Privacy Matrix: We generate a random dataset (histogram) with n = 10, 000 records
from a data universe of size N = 50. We then randomly sample N distinct two-dimensional points
{(ui, vi)}Ni=1 from a subset S = [0, 100]× [0, 100] ⊆ R2, and associate each point (ui, vi) with an
element (i ∈ [N ]) of the data universe. The sampled data universe elements are shown in Figure 1a.
We define the privacy matrix dX : [N ] × [N ] → R based on the Euclidean distance (metric) on
2-dimensional space. Specifically, for any i, j ∈ [N ], define dX (i, j) :=
√
(ui − uj)2 + (vi − vj)2.
Random Queries: We evaluate the two mechanisms over 1000 random single linear queries, where
the query coefficients are randomly drawn from a uniform distribution over the real interval [0, 1].
Performance Measure: We measure the performance of the mechanisms by the root mean squared
error (RMSE; between the private response and the actual output) on the above generated data,
i.e., we consider the squared loss function ` (y, y′) = ‖y − y′‖22. Then the model parameters c and
q′ of the dX -private Laplace mechanism can be obtained by solving the following pre-processing
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Figure 1: Synthetic experiment with N = 50, and dX metric defined based on Euclidean distance.
optimization problem (for each query q):
minimize
c,q′
f (c, q′) := n2 ‖cq′ − q‖22 + 2c2
subject to
∣∣q′i − q′j∣∣ ≤ dX (i, j) , ∀i, j ∈ [N ]
c > 0.
Since n is very large, by fixing cq′ = q in the above problem, we obtain an approximately optimal
(closed form) solution given by c = maxi,j
|qi−qj |
dX (i,j)
, and q′ = 1c q.
Improvement Factor: For a given single linear query q, the improvement factor of the dX -private
Laplace mechanism compared to the baseline (-differentially private Laplace) mechanism is defined
as IF (q) := ∆
q
1/
c . This factor is just a ratio between the scales (λ) of the noise (Lap (λ)) added by
these two mechanisms. Then for each random query (1000 in total), we compute the improvement
factor. The resulted values are presented in a histogram form in Figure 1b, where the dX -private
mechanism exhibits significant improvement in utility compared to the baseline mechanism. We
note that the improvement factor is not a reasonable performance measure when the spread of the
elements of the data universe is profoundly non-uniform (e.g., two points are infinitesimally close to
each other). But in both our real and synthetic data, the elements are (roughly) uniformly spread.
4.2 Multi-Linear Queries over Synthetic Data
We consider the same data, privacy matrix, and performance measure (squared loss) used in Sec-
tion 4.1. But here we work with random multi-linear queries given by Q ∈ RK×N , where we vary K
from 1 to 10. The entries of the query matrix are either drawn from a uniform distribution over [0, 1]
or a random binary number.
Again, we compare the dX -private Laplace mechanism (4) to the -differentially private Laplace
mechanism (1), with  = mini,j dX (i, j). The model parameters Q′ ∈ RK×N and c ∈ RK of the
dX -private Laplace mechanism (4) can be obtained from the optimization problem (5) with loss
function ` (y, y′) = ‖y − y′‖22. Since n is very large, by imposing the constraint c  Q′ = Q, the
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Algorithm 3 Parameter Selection Algorithm: PSA(dX , Q)
Input: privacy metric dX , and query matrix Q ∈ RK×N .
Let R = 0K , T = 1K .
while T 6= 0K do
1. c′k = maxi,j
|Qk,i−Qk,j |
dX (i,j)
, ∀k ∈ [K]. {near optimal scale of the noise for query Qk,:, if
the whole privacy budget is consumed by it.}
2. dkX (i, j) = dX (i, j) ·
1
c′
k
|Qk,i−Qk,j |∑K
l=1
1
c′
l
|Ql,i−Ql,j | , ∀k ∈ [K], ∀i, j ∈ [N ].{distribute the privacy
budget between each query, based on c′k’s.}
3. ck = maxi,j
|Qk,i−Qk,j |
dkX (i,j)
, ∀k ∈ [K]. {calculate the scale of the noise for each single
linear query by considering the privacy budget allocated to them.}
4. dX (i, j) = dX (i, j)−
∑K
k=1
1
ck
|Qk,i −Qk,j |, ∀i, j ∈ [N ]. {calculate the remaining
(total) privacy budget.}
5. T =
[
1
c1
, . . . , 1cK
]
, and R = R+ T . {accumulate the share gained at this step.}
end while
Output: c =
[
1
R1
, . . . , 1RK
]
resulting optimization problem can be written as follows (for each query Q):
minimize
c
‖c‖22 =
K∑
k=1
c2k
subject to
K∑
k=1
1
ck
|Qk,i −Qk,j | ≤ dX (i, j) , ∀i, j ∈ [N ]
ck ≥ 0, ∀k ∈ [K].
In particular, we consider the following three different strategies to choose c ∈ RK (with Q′k,: =
1
ck
Qk,:,∀k ∈ [K]), in a way that satisfy the constraints of the optimization above problem:
1. Strategy 1 : ck = maxi,j
|Qk,i−Qk,j |
dX (i,j)/K
, ∀k ∈ [K], i.e., we share the privacy budget equally
(dX (i,j)K ) between the queries.
2. Strategy 2 : ck = maxi,j
‖Q:,i−Q:,j‖1
dX (i,j)
, ∀k ∈ [K], i.e., we add same scale noise to all the
query response components.
3. Strategy 3 : We obtain c via Algorithm 3.
For a given multi-linear query Q ∈ RK×N , the improvement factor of the dX -private Laplace
mechanism (4) compared to the baseline (-differentially private Laplace, (1)) mechanism is defined
as IF (Q) :=
{
∆Q1 /
c1
· ∆Q1 /c2 · · ·
∆Q1 /
cK
}1/K
. For each K ∈ [10], we randomly draw 100 query
matrices Q ∈ RK×N , and compute the (averaged) improvement factor IF (Q) for the above three
different choices of c. The results are shown in Figure 1c and 1d. We can see that Strategy 3 works
better with queries having natural numbers as coefficients (cf. Figure 1d). This is true since there is a
high likelihood that two query coefficients are the same (i.e., qi = qj), resulting in no depletion of
the privacy budget dX (i, j).
4.3 Single Linear Queries over Real Data
As stated in [1], when dealing with geographic locations, it might be acceptable to disclose the region
of an individual. However, disclosing the precise location (town) of the individual is likely to be
undesired. Thus it would be useful to have a distinguishability level that depends on the geographic
distance.
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Figure 2: Real-data (USA cities [16]) experiment with N = 741, and dX metric defined based on
Euclidean distance.
We empirically evaluate dX -private Laplace mechanism for random single linear queries on a
geolocation dataset with longitude, latitude, and elevation attributes. The dataset consists of the
location and population of US cities with more than 50k inhabitants (N = 741 in total) [16, 17].
We translate this dataset into a histogram over the towns. The 2D-locations (longitude and latitude
wise) of the towns are presented in Figure 2a. We define the privacy budget dX based on the Euclidean
distance on this 2D-representation.
The improvement factors of 1000 queries are presented in Figure 2b. We also tested the particular
query “average elevation of an American individual’s house” (the coefficient are simply the elevation
d value of each city), and in this case our algorithm performed particularly well : the improvement
factor is 202. That kind of improvement is possible because, there is a strong correlation between the
query and the distance map : two close cities (i.e. they have a strong privacy requirement) will have
close elevation values.
4.4 Experiments with Blowfish Privacy
Our general pre-processing strategy applies to any metric, thus our techniques can be extended to
Blowfish (Distance Threshold model) [5] privacy notion as well. We can carefully define a dX
metric for any privacy policy considered in the blowfish framework. First, we define dX such that
dX (i, j) = ∞,∀i 6= j, and dX (k, k) = 0,∀k. Then for each pair of neighbors (i, j), we check if
there is a secret to be protected with the blowfish policy. If so we just set dX (i, j) =  (the privacy
budget). Finally, we need to make sure (possibly by some transformations) that the resulting dX
satisfies the triangular inequality.
We consider the same data, single linear queries, and performance measure (squared loss) used in
Section 4.1. But here we work with two different privacy metrics. Given a threshold T , and a privacy
parameter , define:
1. dBlowX s.t. d
Blow
X (i, j) =  if d
Euc
X (i, j) ≤ T , and dBlowX (i, j) =∞ otherwise
2. dSmoothX s.t. d
Smooth
X (i, j) =  if d
Euc
X (i, j) ≤ T , and dSmoothX (i, j) = d
Euc
X (i,j)
T otherwise,
where dEucX (i, j) :=
√
(ui − uj)2 + (vi − vj)2.
First, we compute the average RMSE over 1000 random single linear queries under both privacy
metrics defined above (for different values of  and T ). The results are shown in Figure 3. We can see
that the results under both metrics are roughly same. The higher the threshold T (i.e., more neighbors
are protected), the higher is the average error. The dSmoothX metric behaves like the d
Euc
X metric after
the threshold value. Thus it induces tighter (and smoother) privacy than dBlowX , and results in a higher
average error for the same threshold.
Then we fix  = 1, and for each random query (1000 in total), we compute the improvement factor.
The resulted values are presented in a distribution form in Figure 4. Observe that for higher threshold
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Figure 3: Average RMSE (over 1000 random single linear queries) under different privacy metrics
(with N = 50, and T = 2, 4, 8, 16).
values the distributions under both metrics are roughly similar, but for lower threshold values (e.g.
T = 2), the improvement factor under dBlowX is better than under d
Smooth
X .
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Figure 4: Distribution of the improvement factors (for 1000 random single linear queries) under
different privacy metrics (with N = 50,  = 1, and T = 2, 4, 8, 16).
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we developed new dX -private mechanisms for linear queries by extending the standard
-differentially private mechanisms. These new mechanisms fully utilize the privacy budgets of
different elements and maximize the utility of the private response. We have empirically shown
that carefully selecting the model parameters of the dX -private mechanisms (depending on the
utility function and dX -metric) can result in substantial improvement upon the baseline mechanism
regarding the utility. Here we also note that for statistical queries (which is a special case of linear
queries), we can design dX -private mechanisms efficiently by exploiting the sum-structure. We refer
the reader to Appendix A for more details.
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A Statistical Queries
A statistical query on a data universe X ⊂ Rd is defined by a mapping q : X → Y ⊂ Rk. Abusing
notation, we define the evaluation of a statistical query q on the database x ∈ Xn to be the average of
the predicate over the rows
q (x) =
1
n
n∑
i=1
q (xi). (9)
When q (u) = u, ∀u ∈ X , we call it d-way marginal query. We can actually treat the statistical query
as a liner query over histogram (y ∈ NN ) with query matrix Q ∈ Rk×N . But we can exploit the
sum-structure ((9)) of it to design efficient algorithms.
Definition 10. For u, v ∈ X (with u 6= v), define the generalized global sensitivity of a query q ∈ Q
(w.r.t. ‖·‖) is defined as follows
∆q‖·‖ (u, v) := max
x,x′∈Xn:‖x−x′‖H≤1,xi=u,x′i=v for i∈[n]
‖q (x)− q (x′)‖.
Also define ∆q‖·‖ := maxu,v∈X ∆
q
‖·‖ (u, v) (the usual global sensitivity). When ‖·‖ = ‖·‖p, we
simply write ∆qp.
The generalized global sensitivity (for u, v ∈ X ) of the statistical query q is given by
∆q‖·‖ (u, v) = max
x,x′∈Xn:‖x−x′‖H≤1,xi 6=x′i,xi=u,x′i=v for i∈[n]
∥∥∥∥∥ 1n
n∑
i=1
q (xi)− 1
n
n∑
i=1
q (x′i)
∥∥∥∥∥
=
‖q (u)− q (v)‖
n
.
For the d-way marginal query q, we have ∆q‖·‖ (u, v) =
‖u−v‖
n .
Definition 11. Let X (with φ ∈ X ) be the data universe, dX : X × X → R be the privacy budget,
and q : Xn → Y be the query. A mechanism M : Xn × Q  Y is said to be dX -private iff
∀x, x′ ∈ Xn s.t. ‖x− x′‖H ≤ 1, and xi 6= x′i (for some i ∈ [n]), ∀S ⊆ Y and ∀q ∈ Q we have
P [M (x, q) ∈ S]
P [M (x′, q) ∈ S] ≤ exp (dX (xi, x
′
i)) .
When dX (u, v) = ,∀u, v ∈ X , we recover the standard -differential privacy, and when dX (u, v) =
u ∧ v for u, v ∈ X , we recover the instance specific differential privacy notion introduced in [18].
For a given query q : Xn → Y ⊂ Rk over the database x ∈ Xn, consider the following variant of
Laplace mechanism (with the mapping X 7→ X ′, and c ∈ Rk):
Z = MLap,c (x′, q) := c q (x′) + (Y1, . . . ,Yk) , (10)
where Yi
⊥∼ Lap (ci). Below we show that the above variant of Laplace mechanism satisfies the
dX -privacy under a sensitivity bound condition.
Proposition 5. Let q′ (u) := q (u′) ,∀u ∈ X under the mapping X 7→ X ′. If ∆q′1 (u, v) ≤ dX (u, v),∀u, v ∈ X , then the mechanismMLap,c (x′, q) given by (10) satisfies the dX -privacy.
The sensitivity bound condition of the above proposition for a statistical query q can be written as
follows:
∆q
′
1 (u, v) =
‖q (u′)− q (v′)‖1
n
≤ dX (u, v) , ∀u, v ∈ X .
For the d-way marginal query, the above condition reduces to ‖u′ − v′‖1 ≤ ndX (u, v) ,∀u, v ∈ X .
The next proposition characterizes the performance of theMLap,c (x′, q) mechanism under different
choices of utility measures:
Proposition 6. Let q : Xn → Rk be a statistical query of the form q (x) = 1n
∑n
i=1 q (xi), and let
Z =MLap,c (x′, q) = c q (x′) + Y with Yi ⊥∼ Lap (ci).
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1. When `22 (y, y
′) = ‖y − y′‖22, we have
err`22 (MLap,c, q) ≤ 2
{
max
u∈X
‖c q (u′)− q (u)‖22 + 2 ‖c‖22
}
.
2. When `p (y, y′) = ‖y − y′‖p, we have
err`p (MLap,c, q) ≤ max
u∈X
‖c q (u′)− q (u)‖p + E
Yi
⊥∼Lap(ci)
[
‖Y‖p
]
.
3. ∀δ ∈ (0, 1], with probability at least 1− δ we have
‖Z− q (x)‖∞ ≤ maxu∈X ‖c q (u
′)− q (u)‖∞ + ln
(
k
δ
)
· ‖c‖∞ .
Now we model the following optimization problem to select the model parameters c and X 7→ X ′ of
theMLap,c (x′, q) mechanism:
minimize
c,X ′
f`,M (c,X ′; q, n)
subject to ‖q (u′)− q (v′)‖1 ≤ ndX (u, v) , ∀u, v ∈ X
c  0.
(11)
The objective function f`,M (c,X ′; q, n) depends on the utility function that we are inter-
ested in. For example, when `22 (y, y
′) = ‖y − y′‖22, we can choose f`22,M (c,X ′; q, n) =
maxu∈X ‖c q (u′)− q (u)‖22 + 2 ‖c‖22. In fact there are two ways to design dX -private mech-
anisms from existing -differentially private mechanisms: either transform the query vector or the
data universe. The approach we used above is X 7→ X ′ (that is q (u)→ q′ (u) = q (u′)). Thus we
can reduce the number of variables in the pre-processing optimization by a factor of k.
Consider a privacy budget (metric) of the form dX (u, v) =
∑d
i=1 di (ui, vi), where for example
di (ui, vi) = iJui 6= viK. In this case, if |u′i − v′i| ≤ ndi (ui, vi) ,∀ui, vi ∈ Xi (for example, when
X = {−1,+1}d, we have Xi = {−1,+1}), then the d-way marginal query is dX -private. Moreover,
when `1 (y, y′) = ‖y − y′‖1, we have f`1,M (c,X ′; q, n) =
∑k
i=1 fi (ci,Xi) with fi (ci,Xi) =
maxui∈Xi |ciu′i − ui| + ci for d-way marginal queries (since maxu∈X ‖c q (u′)− q (u)‖1 +
E
Yi
⊥∼Lap(ci)
[‖Y‖1] = maxu∈X
∑k
i=1 |ciu′i − ui| + ‖c‖1 =
∑k
i=1 maxui∈Xi |ciu′i − ui| +
∑k
i=1 ci).
Thus in this setting, we can instantiate and relax the above optimization problem (11) in to k
independent optimization problems as follows:
minimize
ci,X ′i
max
ui∈Xi
|ciu′i − ui|+ ci
subject to |u′i − v′i| ≤ ndi (ui, vi) , ∀ui, vi ∈ Xi
ci ≥ 0.
(12)
B Pre-processing Optimization
In section 3, we have shown that by (approximately) solving certain pre-processing optimization
problems (e.g. (5),(8)), we can obtain the model parameters of the dX -private mechanisms with
enhanced utility. One can easily verify that these problems are non-convex optimization problems.
Recently, in the optimization and machine learning community, there is a huge interest in developing
efficient algorithms for non-convex optimization problems with provable guarantees [19]. One can
also observe that these pre-processing optimization problems exhibit coordinate friendly structures,
and thus the coordinate descent family of algorithms [20] is a natural choice to solve them.
Consider the optimization problem (5) under squared loss. One can easily verify that f (c,Q′) =
n2 ‖cQ′ −Q‖22 + 2 ‖c‖22 is a (smooth) multi-convex function i.e. f (·, Q′) is convex in c for
any fixed Q′, and f (c, ·) is convex in Q′ for any fixed c, but f is not jointly convex in (c,Q′).
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Recently [21] have shown that under certain conditions, the multi-convex optimization problem
can be efficiently solved via a variant of cyclic block coordinate descent algorithm. Now consider
the optimization problem (8) with the objective function f (c,Q′) = nmaxq∈Q ‖cq′ − q‖∞ +
20
52/3
(
n2 logN log |Q|)1/3 c1/3. In this case, the objective function is both non-smooth and non-
convex, thus the resulting problem is very hard to optimize.
C Proofs
C.1 Laplace Mechanism
Proposition 1. If ∆q
′
1 (i, j) ≤ dX (i, j), ∀i, j ∈ [N ], then the mechanismMLap,c (·, c q′) given
by (4) satisfies the dX -privacy.
Proof. Let x, x′ ∈ RN s.t. ‖x− x′‖1 ≤ 2, xi 6= x′i, and xj 6= x′j , and let q ∈ Q. Let px and px′
denote the probability density functions ofMLap,c (x, q) andMLap,c (x′, q) respectively. Then for
any z ∈ Y we have
px (z)
px′ (z)
= Πki=1
 exp
(
−|ciq
′(x)i−zi|
ci
)
exp
(
−|ciq′(x′)i−zi|ci
)

= Πki=1
(
exp
( |ciq′ (x′)i − zi| − |ciq′ (x)i − zi|
ci
))
(i)
≤ Πki=1
(
exp
( |ciq′ (x′)i − ciq′ (x)i|
ci
))
= exp (‖q′ (x)− q′ (x′)‖1)
(ii)
≤ exp
(
∆q
′
1 (i, j)
)
≤ exp (dX (i, j)) ,
where (i) follows from the triangle inequality and (ii) follows from the definition of generalized
global sensitivity and due to the choice of x and x′. That px(z)px′ (z) ≥ exp (−dX (i, j)) follows by
symmetry.
Proposition 2. Let Q : RN → Rk be a multi-linear query of the form Q (x) = Qx, and let
Z =MLap,c (x, cQ′) = cQ′x+ Y with Yi ⊥∼ Lap (ci).
1. When `22 (y, y
′) = ‖y − y′‖22, we have
err`22 (MLap,c (·, cQ′) , Q) ≤ 2
{
n2 ‖cQ′ −Q‖22 + 2 ‖c‖22
}
,
where err` (M, Q) is defined in (2).
2. When `p (y, y′) = ‖y − y′‖p, we have
err`p (MLap,c (·, cQ′) , Q) ≤ n ‖cQ′ −Q‖p + E
Yi
⊥∼Lap(ci)
[
‖Y‖p
]
.
Note that err`1 (MLap,c (·, cQ′) , Q) ≤ n ‖cQ′ −Q‖1 + ‖c‖1.
3. ∀δ ∈ (0, 1], with probability at least 1− δ we have
‖Qx− Z‖∞ ≤ n ‖cQ′ −Q‖∞ + ln
(
k
δ
)
· ‖c‖∞ .
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Proof. Part 1. Consider
E
Z
[` (Z, Q (x))] = E
Z
[
‖Z−Qx‖22
]
= E
Yi
⊥∼Lap(ci)
[
‖cQ′x+ Y−Qx‖22
]
(i)
≤ E
Yi
⊥∼Lap(ci)
[
(‖cQ′x−Qx‖2 + ‖Y‖2)2
]
(ii)
≤ 2 E
Yi
⊥∼Lap(ci)
[
‖cQ′x−Qx‖22 + ‖Y‖22
]
= 2
{
‖cQ′x−Qx‖22 + E
Yi
⊥∼Lap(ci)
[
‖Y‖22
]}
= 2
{
k∑
i=1
∣∣〈ciQ′i,: −Qi,:, x〉∣∣2 + E
Yi
⊥∼Lap(ci)
[
‖Y‖22
]}
(iii)
≤ 2
{
k∑
i=1
∥∥ciQ′i,: −Qi,:∥∥22 ‖x‖22 + E
Yi
⊥∼Lap(ci)
[
‖Y‖22
]}
= 2
{
‖x‖22
k∑
i=1
∥∥ciQ′i,: −Qi,:∥∥22 + E
Yi
⊥∼Lap(ci)
[
‖Y‖22
]}
(iv)
≤ 2
{
n2
k∑
i=1
∥∥ciQ′i,: −Qi,:∥∥22 + E
Yi
⊥∼Lap(ci)
[
‖Y‖22
]}
= 2
{
n2 ‖cQ′ −Q‖22 + E
Yi
⊥∼Lap(ci)
[
‖Y‖22
]}
(v)
= 2
{
n2 ‖cQ′ −Q‖22 + 2 ‖c‖22
}
where (i) is by triangle inequality, (ii) is due to the fact that (a + b)2 ≤ 2a2 + 2b2, (iii) is by
Hölder’s Inequality, (iv) is due to the fact that ‖x‖2 ≤ ‖x‖1 = n, and (v) is due to the fact that
E
Yi
⊥∼Lap(ci)
[
‖Y‖22
]
= 2 ‖c‖22 (since EX∼Lap(λ)
[
X2
]
= 2λ2 for X ∈ R). This completes the proof of
first part.
Part 2. Consider (by the similar reasoning as of Part 1)
E
Z
[` (Z, Q (x))] = E
Z
[
‖Z−Qx‖p
]
= E
Yi
⊥∼Lap(ci)
[
‖cQ′x+ Y−Qx‖p
]
≤ E
Yi
⊥∼Lap(ci)
[
‖cQ′x−Qx‖p + ‖Y‖p
]
= ‖cQ′x−Qx‖p + E
Yi
⊥∼Lap(ci)
[
‖Y‖p
]
= ‖cQ′x−Qx‖p + E
Yi
⊥∼Lap(ci)
[
‖Y‖p
]
=
(
k∑
i=1
∣∣〈ciQ′i,: −Qi,:, x〉∣∣p
)1/p
+ E
Yi
⊥∼Lap(ci)
[
‖Y‖p
]
≤
(
k∑
i=1
∥∥ciQ′i,: −Qi,:∥∥pp ‖x‖pq
)1/p
+ E
Yi
⊥∼Lap(ci)
[
‖Y‖p
]
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= ‖x‖q
(
k∑
i=1
∥∥ciQ′i,: −Qi,:∥∥pp
)1/p
+ E
Yi
⊥∼Lap(ci)
[
‖Y‖p
]
≤ n
(
k∑
i=1
∥∥ciQ′i,: −Qi,:∥∥pp
)1/p
+ E
Yi
⊥∼Lap(ci)
[
‖Y‖p
]
= n ‖cQ′ −Q‖p + E
Yi
⊥∼Lap(ci)
[
‖Y‖p
]
.
Note that E
Yi
⊥∼Lap(ci)
[‖Y‖1] = ‖c‖1 (since EX∼Lap(λ) [|X|] = λ for X ∈ R).
Part 3. We will use the fact that if Y ∼ Lap (b), then P [|Y| ≥ t · b] = exp (−t). We have:
P
[
‖cQ′x− Z‖∞ ≥ ln
(
k
δ
)
· ‖c‖∞
]
= P
[
max
i∈[k]
|Yi| ≥ ln
(
k
δ
)
· ‖c‖∞
]
≤ k · P
[
|Yi| ≥ ln
(
k
δ
)
· ‖c‖∞
]
≤ k · P
[
|Yi| ≥ ln
(
k
δ
)
· ci
]
= k ·
(
δ
k
)
= δ
where the second to last equality follows from the fact that each Yi ∼ Lap (ci). That is with
probability at least 1− δ we have
‖Qx− Z‖∞ ≤ ‖cQ′x−Qx‖∞ + ln
(
k
δ
)
· ‖c‖∞
= max
i∈[k]
∣∣〈ciQ′i,: −Qi,:, x〉∣∣+ ln(kδ
)
· ‖c‖∞
≤ max
i∈[k]
∥∥ciQ′i,: −Qi,:∥∥∞ ‖x‖1 + ln(kδ
)
· ‖c‖∞
= nmax
i∈[k]
∥∥ciQ′i,: −Qi,:∥∥∞ + ln(kδ
)
· ‖c‖∞
= n ‖cQ′ −Q‖∞ + ln
(
k
δ
)
· ‖c‖∞ .
C.2 Exponential Mechanism
Theorem 1. If ∆u′ (i, j) ≤ cdX (i, j) ,∀i, j ∈ [N ], then the mechanismMExp,c (·, u′) satisfies the
dX -privacy.
Proof. For clarity, we assume R to be finite. Let x, x′ ∈ RN s.t. ‖x− x′‖1 ≤ 2, xi 6= x′i and
xj 6= x′j . Then for any r ∈ R we have
P [MExp,c (x, u′) = r]
P [MExp,c (x′, u′) = r] =
 exp(u′(x,r)2c )∑
r′∈R exp
(
u′(x,r′)
2c
)

 exp(u′(x′,r)2c )∑
r′∈R exp
(
u′(x′,r′)
2c
)

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= exp
(
u′(x,r)
2c
)
exp
(
u′(x′,r)
2c
)
 ·

∑
r′∈R exp
(
u′(x′,r′)
2c
)
∑
r′∈R exp
(
u′(x,r′)
2c
)

= exp
(
u′ (x, r)− u′ (x′, r)
2c
)
·

∑
r′∈R exp
(
u′(x′,r′)
2c
)
∑
r′∈R exp
(
u′(x,r′)
2c
)

≤ exp
(
∆u′ (i, j)
2c
)
·

∑
r′∈R exp
(
u′(x,r′)+∆u′(i,j)
2c
)
∑
r′∈R exp
(
u′(x,r′)
2c
)

= exp
(
∆u′ (i, j)
2c
)
· exp
(
∆u′ (i, j)
2c
)
· (1)
= exp (dX (i, j)) .
Similarly,
P[MExp,c(x,u′)=r]
P[MExp,c(x′,u′)=r] ≥ exp (−dX (i, j)) by symmetry.
Theorem 2. Fixing a database x, letR?u′ = {r ∈ R : u′ (x, r) = ?u′ (x)} denote the set of elements
in R which attain utility score ?u′ (x). Also define δu,u′ := maxx,r |u (x, r)− u′ (x, r)|. Then for
Z =MExp,c (x, u′), we have
P
[
u (x,Z) ≤ δu,u′ + ?u′ (x)− 2c
{
ln
(
|R|∣∣R?u′ ∣∣
)
+ t
}]
≤ e−t.
Since we always have
∣∣R?u′ ∣∣ ≥ 1, we get
P [u (x,Z) ≤ δu,u′ + ?u′ (x)− 2c {ln (|R|) + t}] ≤ e−t.
Proof.
P [u′ (x,Z) ≤ α] ≤ |R| exp (α/2c)∣∣R?u′ ∣∣ exp (?u′ (x) /2c)
=
|R|∣∣R?u′ ∣∣ exp
(
α− ?u′ (x)
2c
)
.
The inequality follows from the observation that each r ∈ R with u′ (x, r) ≤ α has un-normalized
probability mass at most exp (α/2c), and hence the entire set of such “bad” elements r has total
un-normalized probability mass at most |R| exp (α/2c). In contrast, we know that there exist at
least
∣∣R?u′ ∣∣ ≥ 1 elements with u′ (x, r) = ?u′ (x), and hence un-normalized probability mass∣∣R?u′ ∣∣ exp (?u′ (x) /2c), and so this is a lower bound on the normalization term. The proof is
completed by plugging in the appropriate value for α, and by noting that
u (x, r) ≤ u′ (x, r) + |u (x, r)− u′ (x, r)| ≤ u′ (x, r) + max
x,r
|u (x, r)− u′ (x, r)| .
C.2.1 Small Database Mechanism
Proposition 3. If
∣∣q′i − q′j∣∣ ≤ dX (i, j) ,∀i, j ∈ [N ] and ∀q′ ∈ Q′, then the small database mecha-
nism is dX -private.
Proof. First we will find the condition for ∆u′ (i, j) ≤ cdX (i, j) ,∀i, j ∈ [N ] and ∀q′ ∈ Q′:
∆u′ (i, j) = max
y∈R
max
x,x′∈RN :‖x−x′‖1≤2,xi 6=x′i,xj 6=x′j for i,j∈[N ]
|u′ (x, y)− u′ (x′, y)|.
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For some x, x′ ∈ NN such that ‖x− x′‖1 ≤ 2, xi 6= x′i, xj 6= x′j for some i, j ∈ [N ], we have:
|u′ (x, y)− u′ (x′, y)| =
∣∣∣∣c maxq′∈Q′ |q′ (x′)− q′ (y)| − c maxq′∈Q′ |q′ (x)− q′ (y)|
∣∣∣∣
(i)
≤ c max
q′∈Q′
|{|q′ (x′)− q′ (y)| − |q′ (x)− q′ (y)|}|
(ii)
≤ c max
q′∈Q′
|q′ (x)− q′ (x′)|
= c max
q′∈Q′
|〈q′, x− x′〉|
(iii)
≤ c max
q′∈Q′
∣∣q′i − q′j∣∣ ,
where (i) due to the fact that |maxx |a (x)| −maxx |b (x)|| ≤ maxx |{|a (x)| − |b (x)|}|, (ii) is by
triangle inequality, and (iii) is due to the choice of x and x′. Thus we require
∆u′ (i, j) ≤ c max
q′∈Q′
∣∣q′i − q′j∣∣ ≤ cdX (i, j) .
The Small Database mechanism is simply an instantiation of theMExp,c (·, u′) mechanism. There-
fore, privacy follows from Theorem 1.
We use the following theorem from [15] directly.
Theorem 6 (Theorem 4.2, [15]). For any finite class of linear queries Q′, if R ={
y ∈ NN : ‖y‖1 =
log |Q′|
α2
}
then for all x ∈ NN , there exists a y ∈ R such that:
max
q′∈Q′
|cq′ (x)− cq′ (y)| ≤ αn.
Proposition 4. Let Q be any class of linear queries. Let y be the database output by
SmallDB (x,Q′, c, α). Then with probability 1− β:
max
q∈Q
|q (x)− cq′ (y)| ≤ nmax
q∈Q
‖q − cq′‖∞ + αn+ 2c
{
logN log |Q|
α2
+ log
(
1
β
)}
.
Proof. Applying the utility bounds for theMExp,c (·, u′) mechanism (Theorem 2) with − ?u′ (x) ≥
αn (which follows from Theorem 6), we find:
P
[
max
q′∈Q′
|cq′ (x)− cq′ (y)| ≥ αn+ 2c {ln (|R|) + t}
]
≤ e−t.
By noting that R, which is the set of all databases of size at most log |Q|/α2 (since |Q′| = |Q|),
satisfies |R| ≤ |X |log |Q|/α2 and by setting t = log
(
1
β
)
, we get with probability 1− β:
max
q′∈Q′
|cq′ (x)− cq′ (y)| ≤ αn+ 2c
{
logN log |Q|
α2
+ log
(
1
β
)}
.
Thus with probability 1− β we have (q′ ∈ Q′ is the one-to-one mapping of q ∈ Q):
max
q∈Q
|q (x)− cq′ (y)|
(i)
≤ max
q∈Q
{|q (x)− cq′ (x)|+ |cq′ (x)− cq′ (y)|}
(ii)
≤ max
q∈Q
|q (x)− cq′ (x)|+ max
q∈Q
|cq′ (x)− cq′ (y)|
= max
q∈Q
|〈q − cq′, x〉|+ max
q∈Q
|cq′ (x)− cq′ (y)|
(iii)
≤ ‖x‖1 maxq∈Q ‖q − cq
′‖∞ + maxq∈Q |cq
′ (x)− cq′ (y)|
(iv)
= nmax
q∈Q
‖q − cq′‖∞ + maxq′∈Q′ |cq
′ (x)− cq′ (y)|
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≤ nmax
q∈Q
‖q − cq′‖∞ + αn+ 2c
{
logN log |Q|
α2
+ log
(
1
β
)}
,
where (i) is by triangle inequality, (ii) is due to the fact that maxx {a(x) + b(x)} ≤ maxx a(x) +
maxx b(x), (iii) is by the Hölder’s Inequality, and (iv) is due to the fact that ‖x‖1 = n.
Theorem 3. By the appropriate choice of α, letting y be the database output by
SmallDB
(
x,Q′, c, α2
)
, we can ensure that with probability 1− β:
max
q∈Q
|q (x)− cq′ (y)| ≤ nmax
q∈Q
‖q − cq′‖∞ +
(
cn2
{
16 logN log |Q|+ 4 log
(
1
β
)})1/3
. (13)
Equivalently, for any c such that
c ≤ α
3n
16 logN log |Q|+ 4 log
(
1
β
) (14)
with probability 1− β: maxq∈Q |q (x)− cq′ (y)| ≤ nmaxq∈Q ‖q − cq′‖∞ + αn.
Proof. By Proposition 4, we get:
max
q∈Q
|q (x)− cq′ (y)| ≤ nmax
q∈Q
‖q − cq′‖∞ +
α
2
n+ 2c
{
4 logN log |Q|
α2
+ log
(
1
β
)}
.
Setting this quantity to be at most nmaxq∈Q ‖q − cq′‖p + αn and solving for c yields (14). Solving
for α yields (13).
C.2.2 Multiplicative Weights Exponential Mechanism
Theorem 4. If
∣∣q′i − q′j∣∣ ≤ dX (i, j) ,∀i, j ∈ [N ] and ∀q′ ∈ Q′, then the MWEM mechanism is
dX -private.
Proof. Exponential Mechanism: Consider the utility function u′ : NN ×Q′ → R given by
u′ (x, q′) := c |q′ (y)− q′ (x)| , for some y ∈ RN .
First we find a condition for ∆u′ (i, j) ≤ cdX (i, j) ,∀i, j ∈ [N ] and ∀q′ ∈ Q′:
∆u′ (i, j) = max
q′∈Q′
max
x,x′∈NN :‖x−x′‖1≤2,xi 6=x′i,xj 6=x′j for i,j∈[N ]
|u′ (x, q′)− u′ (x′, q′)|.
For some x, x′ ∈ NN such that ‖x− x′‖1 ≤ 2, xi 6= x′i, xj 6= x′j for some i, j ∈ [N ], we have:
|u′ (x, q′)− u′ (x′, q′)| = |c |q′ (y)− q′ (x)| − c |q′ (y)− q′ (x′)||
(i)
≤ c |q′ (x′)− q′ (x)|
= c |〈q′, x− x′〉|
(ii)
≤ c ∣∣q′i − q′j∣∣ ,
where (i) is by triangle inequality, and (ii) is due to the choice of x and x′. That is we require
∆u′ (i, j) ≤ c ∣∣q′i − q′j∣∣ ≤ cdX (i, j) .
Thus with the above transformed class Q′, if we use the MExp,2cT (x, u′) mechanism, we get
dX (i,j)
2T -privacy.
Laplace Mechanism: If
∣∣q′i − q′j∣∣ ≤ dX (i, j) ,∀i, j ∈ [N ] and ∀q′ ∈ Q′, then the Laplace mecha-
nism given by m = cq′ (x) + Lap (2cT ) satisfies dX (i,j)2T -privacy.
The composition rules for dX -privacy state that c values accumulate appropriately. We make T
calls to the Exponential Mechanism with parameter 2cT and T calls to the Laplace Mechanism with
parameter 2cT , resulting in dX -privacy.
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Theorem 5. For any dataset x, set of linear queries Q, T ∈ N, and c > 0, with probability at least
1− 2T/ |Q|, MWEM produces y such that
max
q∈Q
|cq′ (y)− q (x)| ≤ 2n
√
logN
T
+ 10Tc log |Q|+ nmax
q∈Q
‖cq′ − q‖∞ .
By setting 2n
√
logN
T = 10Tc log |Q|, we get
max
q∈Q
|cq′ (y)− q (x)| ≤ nmax
q∈Q
‖cq′ − q‖∞ +
20
52/3
(
n2 logN log |Q|)1/3 c1/3.
Proof. The following inequality follows directly by replacing the  by 1c along the proof given in [9]
(since |Q′| = |Q|):
max
q′∈Q′
|cq′ (y)− cq′ (x)| ≤ 2n
√
logN
T
+ 10Tc log |Q| .
Then with probability at least 1− 2T/ |Q|, we have
max
q∈Q
|cq′ (y)− q (x)| ≤ max
q∈Q
{|cq′ (y)− cq′ (x)|+ |cq′ (x)− q (x)|}
≤ max
q′∈Q′
|cq′ (y)− cq′ (x)|+ max
q∈Q
|cq′ (x)− q (x)|
= max
q′∈Q′
|cq′ (y)− cq′ (x)|+ max
q∈Q
|〈cq′ − q, x〉|
≤ max
q′∈Q′
|cq′ (y)− cq′ (x)|+ max
q∈Q
‖cq′ − q‖∞ ‖x‖1
≤ 2n
√
logN
T
+ 10Tc log |Q|+ nmax
q∈Q
‖cq′ − q‖∞ .
C.3 Statistical Queries
Proposition 5. Let q′ (u) := q (u′) ,∀u ∈ X under the mapping X 7→ X ′. If ∆q′1 (u, v) ≤ dX (u, v),∀u, v ∈ X , then the mechanismMLap,c (x′, q) given by (10) satisfies the dX -privacy.
Proof. Proof is similar to that of Proposition 1.
Proposition 6. Let q : Xn → Rk be a statistical query of the form q (x) = 1n
∑n
i=1 q (xi), and let
Z =MLap,c (x′, q) = c q (x′) + Y with Yi ⊥∼ Lap (ci).
1. When `22 (y, y
′) = ‖y − y′‖22, we have
err`22 (MLap,c, q) ≤ 2
{
max
u∈X
‖c q (u′)− q (u)‖22 + 2 ‖c‖22
}
.
2. When `p (y, y′) = ‖y − y′‖p, we have
err`p (MLap,c, q) ≤ max
u∈X
‖c q (u′)− q (u)‖p + E
Yi
⊥∼Lap(ci)
[
‖Y‖p
]
.
3. ∀δ ∈ (0, 1], with probability at least 1− δ we have
‖Z− q (x)‖∞ ≤ maxu∈X ‖c q (u
′)− q (u)‖∞ + ln
(
k
δ
)
· ‖c‖∞ .
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Proof. Proof is similar to that of Proposition 2, but with the following change in the appropriate
places (with q′ (u) := q (u′) ,∀u ∈ X ):
max
x∈Xn
‖c q′ (x)− q (x)‖p = maxx∈Xn
1
n
∥∥∥∥∥c
n∑
i=1
q (x′i)−
n∑
i=1
q (xi)
∥∥∥∥∥
p
≤ max
x∈Xn
1
n
n∑
i=1
‖c q (x′i)− q (xi)‖p
=
1
n
n∑
i=1
max
xi∈X
‖c q (x′i)− q (xi)‖p
= max
u∈X
‖c q (u′)− q (u)‖p .
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